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Abstract: In the history of Indonesia, civil-military relations changed in the 
reformasi era with the separation of the military and the police, resulting in the 
removal of the dual-function doctrine and military reform. Despite so, two decades 
after reformasi has not formed a standard and ideal mechanism to govern civil-
military relations within the framework of objective civilian control. This paper 
addresses issues regarding (a) how the dual-function concept and internal reform 
within the military; (b) regulatory issues that govern military operations other than 
war; (c) the ideal model of civil-military relations in Indonesia to ensure democratic 
life and an overview of the siyāsah sharʻiyyah aspects. Using descriptive 
qualitative method and conducting discussions with military and human rights 
experts, this paper demonstrates that military reform in Indonesia after the New 
Order has not yet been fruitful to accomplish the mission to form professional 
soldiers. The military is still involved in political and civilian life under the pretext 
that there is no military assistance law. As a consequence, the ideal model of civilian 
control that puts the military under the control of civilian authority according to 
siyāsah sharʻiyyah principle has not been fully successful and effective. 
Keywords: The Dual Function, Reformasi, Military, Civilian Control, Siyāsah 
Sharʻiyyah 
Abstrak: Dalam sejarah Indonesia, relasi sipil militer berubah pada era reformasi 
dengan pemisahan militer dan kepolisian yang berdampak pada pencabutan 
doktrin dwifungsi dan reformasi militer. Meskipun demikian, dalam dua dekade 
era reformasi, tampaknya belum ada mekanisme yang baku dan ideal yang 
mengatur relasi sipil militer dalam kerangka kontrol sipil objektif. Tulisan ini 
akan menjawab permasalahan mengenai (a) bagaimana konsepsi dwifungsi dan 
reformasi internal di lingkup militer; (b) persoalan regulasi yang mengatur operasi 
militer selain perang; (c) bagaimana model ideal relasi sipil dan militer di 
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Indonesia untuk memastikan kehidupan demokratis dan tinjauan aspek siyāsah 
sharʻiyyah. Dengan menggunakan metode kualitatif dan penulisannya dilakukan 
secara deskriptif serta diperkuat dengan diskusi terfokus dengan ahli bidang militer 
dan hak asasi manusia, tulisan ini menunjukkan bahwa reformasi militer di 
Indonesia pasca orde baru belum sepenuhnya tuntas menuju profesionalisme 
prajurit. Militer masih berevolusi terlibat dalam kehidupan sipil politik dengan 
dalih belum adanya undang-undang perbantuan militer. Dampaknya, model ideal 
kontrol sipil yang menempatkan militer dalam kendali otoritas sipil sebagaimana 
prinsip siyāsah sharʻiyyah belum sepenuhnya berhasil dan efektif. 
Kata kunci: Dwifungsi, Reformasi Militer, Kontrol Sipil, Siyāsah Sharʻiyyah 
 
Introduction 
On 12 June 2019 President Joko Widodo 
signed Presidential Regulation No. 37 of 
2019 on military‟s functional positions.1 
This regulation then turned polemical. 
On the one hand, it was deemed as a 
legitimation for the intensification of 
positions and the structuring of human 
resources considering the big number of 
top-ranking military officers who were 
jobless. On the other hand, for civil so-
ciety, especially for democracy and hu-
man rights activists, such a regulation 
was not merely an official governance 
system relating to assignments / ap-
pointments in civilian positions, but has 
fundamental problems in civil-military 
relations,2 that is trauma and fears of 
military's highly possible return to so-
cial, political and economic spheres like 
                                                          
1  Presidential Regulation No. 37 of 2019 on 
Functional Positions of the Indonesian 
National Army 
2  Golda Eksa, “Perpres 37/2019 Dinilai 
Degradasi Kemampuan Sipil”, accessed on 
October 17th, 2019, 
https://mediaindonesia.com/read/detail/
244031-perpres-372019-dinilai-degradasi-
kemampuan-sipil  
in Indonesian past under the Old Order 
and the New Order regimes. 
This paper argues that the 
reemergence of the discourse and prob-
lems of civil-military relations in Indo-
nesia is due to civilian elites‟ incon-
sistency in conducting a total placement 
of the military under civil authority. 
This uncertainty is influenced by sever-
al factors, one of which is due to the his-
torical effect that is so central when mil-
itary officers occupied civilian life 
through the dual-function concept of 
the military. While Indonesia‟s highest 
political foundation is the 1945 Consti-
tution, Decree of People's Consultative 
Assembly (TAP MPR) No VI / MPR / 
2000 and Law Number 34/2000 on the 
Indonesian National Armed Forces 
(TNI) which regulates the omission of 
the dual-function doctrine and urges 
the military to focus on national de-
fense, yet the reform within the military 
is still incomplete. Instead, the military 
has transformed into an instrument of 
domestic security. It even functions be-
yond its primary duty, establishing 
Memorandum of Cooperation (MoUs) 
with civil institutions and state-owned 
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enterprises. The absence of a law regu-
lating military assistance in operations 
other than war is used as a pretext for 
the military's return to civilian domain 
through internal cooperation schemes 
carried out without getting political el-
ements involved, especially the DPR. 
This paper discusses a number of ques-
tions (1) how to place the military in the 
concept of siyāsah sharʻiyyah?; (2) what 
is the concept and the implementation 
of the dual function of the Indonesian 
military and internal reform within the 
military?; (3) What is the urgency of en-
acting an assistance law to regulate mil-
itary operations other than war?; and 
(4) how to seek forms or models of civil 
and military relations in Indonesia to 
ensure democratic life and Islamic law? 
Previous studies on civil-military re-
lations in Indonesia have been done 
quite intensively. Dewi Fortuna Anwar3 
in a policy paper entitled Negotiating 
and Consolidating Democratic Civilian 
Control of the Indonesian Military high-
lighted revocation efforts of military's 
socio-political functions and recom-
mended strong, precise political will to 
handle them. Dewi‟s research was con-
ducted in 2001, which is two years after 
the reformasi era and the democratic or-
der is still vulnerable. Meanwhile, re-
search conducted by John Bratford, The 
Indonesian Military as A Professional 
Organization: Criteria and Ramifica-
                                                          
3  Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “Negotiating and 
Consolidating Democratic Civilian Control 
of the Indonesian Military,” East-West 
Center Occasional Papers Politics and 
Security Series (Hawai, USA, 2001). 
tions for Reform,4 revealed that the so-
lidity of the military's internal corps 
was very strong, but control and sur-
veillance mechanism of its members to 
fulfill professional responsibilities was 
still weak. In addition, civil-military re-
lations were also influenced by factions 
within the military and permissive be-
havior of corrupt practices that reduce 
accountability. Based on this back-
ground, this paper aims to reflect on the 
two decades of the reformasi era that is 
still seeking effective forms of civil-
military relations amid all dynamics 
that occur. Besides, this paper offers an 
alternative model for regulating civil-
military relations in the context of 
siyāsah sharʻiyyah that has not been dis-
cussed in previous research. 
This paper uses a qualitative de-
scriptive method. To strengthen the 
analysis, a focused discussion was held 
with some experts, namely Syamsudin 
Haris (LIPI), Al Araf (Imparsial) and 
Agus Widjodjo (Lemhanas). Meanwhile, 
secondary data was obtained from 
books, journals, reports and laws and 
regulations. 
This paper begins by discussing the 
concept of the military in siyāsah 
sharʻiyyah. Next, I will highlight the du-
al function of the military in Indonesian 
history and military reforms in post-Old 
and New Order regimes or more pre-
cisely in the reformasi era. Before dis-
                                                          
4  Jhon Bratdford, “The Indonesian Military as 
A Professional Organization : Criteria and 
Ramifications for Reform,” vol. 73, RSIS 
Working Paper (Singapore: Nanyang 
Technological University, 2005). 
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cussing the ideal civil-military relations 
in Indonesia in siyāsah sharʻiyyah per-
spective, which will be followed by 
some concluding notes, this paper first 
reviews military's functions in Military 
Operations Other Than War. 
The Military in Siyāsah Sharʻiyyah 
Various models of government charac-
terized by democracy, including that of 
Islam, always have three formulations 
of establishment, namely the existence 
of society (ummah), laws (sharīʻah) and 
leadership (khilāfah).5 In Islamic law, the 
conception is fully regulated in siyāsah 
sharʻiyyah. According to Ibn Qayyim al-
Jauziyah, siyāsah sharʻiyyah is "govern-
ment‟s authority to impose desired pol-
icies based on benefits through rules 
that are not contrary to Islam even 
though there is no certain dalil (proof)". 
Thus, in the context of siyāsah sharʻiyyah, 
a legitimate government (executive and 
legislative) as a governing body is given 
the authority to make laws and regula-
tions that govern all affairs within a 
country. The making of regulations or 
policies is solely aimed at the benefit of 
the ummah (community) as well as up-
holding justice (al-ʻadālah wa murāʼat al-
maṣāliḥ al-jāmiʻ al-nās).6  
                                                          
5  Suwantinah, “Analisis Fiqh Siyasah 
Tentang Bela Negara Di Indonesia” 
(Universitas Islam Negeri Raden Inten 
Lampung, 2017). 
6  M Muhtarom, “Kedudukan Peraturan 
Perundang-Undangan Negara Dalam 
Institusi Hukum Islam,” Jurnal Suhuf 27, no. 
Mei 2015 (2015): 22–37. 
Clark Benner Lombardi formulated 
the definition of siyāsah syarʻiyyah, 
which is based on a combination of def-
initions in Arabic: al-siyāsah and al-
sharʻiyyah. In general, al-siyāsah is a 
model of regulating public affairs by 
establishing laws and regulations that 
are applied in a country, including law 
enforcement. Some considerations in 
the formulation of the regulation are 
philosophical values of a country, hu-
manity and ethics. Meanwhile, al-
sharʻiyyah emphasizes consistency with 
sharia principles.7 Thus, siyāsah 
sharʻiyyah is to give instructions on how 
a country should be governed to ensure 
the survival of a civilization. In this con-
text, siyāsah syarʻiyyah provides ar-
rangements regarding aspects that must 
be done by all elements of a country 
and society, and regulates various traits 
that are prohibited by the country.8 
Taking the conception of the Indo-
nesian state into account that also refers 
to sharʻiyyah siyāsah, a constitutionally 
legitimate civilian government is given 
a mandate to regulate all aspects of its 
people‟s lives, including handling the 
                                                          
7  Clark B Lombardi, “Constitutional 
Provisions Making Sharia „A‟ or „The‟ Chief 
Source of Legislation : Ehere Did They 
Come From? What Do They Mean? Do 
They Matter?,” American University 
International Law Review 28, no. 3 (2013): 
733–774. 
8  Fariza Binti Mohd. Sham & Fazilah Binti 
Idris Nurliana Binti Mohd. Hassan, Khairul 
Anwar Bin Mastor, “Bringing Islamic 
Leadership, Unity and Tolerance into 
Reality for the Stability of ASEAN 
Community,” Jurnal Reflektika 11, no. 11 
(2016): 1–11. 
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military in carrying out its main func-
tions. With the authority of siyāsah 
sharʻiyyah, a state through its constitu-
tion, the provisions of the people's con-
sultative assembly and the law, after the 
reformasi era, has set military duties to 
maintain sovereignty, fight the threat of 
foreign countries and protect Indonesia. 
The Dual Function of the Military  
The term dual function was first coined 
by Abdul Haris Nasution at the com-
memoration of the National Military 
Academy on November 12, 1958 in 
Magelang. The concept was influenced 
by General Sudirman‟s brilliant idea 
that the military was a tool of life and 
not a tool of death which had partici-
pated in the nation‟s journey. The con-
cept of the dual function was again 
conveyed at a police heads meeting in 
Porong, East Java in 1960. This dual 
function reflects a wide-ranging role of 
the military as an implementing force in 
defending the state (combat force) as 
well as functioning to give territory ed-
ucation to society.9 
Peter Carey in The Indonesian Army 
and the State: Problems of the Dual 
Function in Early Nineteenth-Century 
Perspective10 illustrates that since the 
                                                          
9  Korenlis Rikan, “Konsep Dwifungsi ABRI 
Dan Perannya Dimasa Pemerintahan Orde 
Baru Tahun 1965-1998” (Yogyakarta, 2014). 
10  Peter Carey, “The Indonesian Army and the 
State: Problems of Dwi Fungsi in Early 
Nineteenth-Century Perspective,” Indonesia 
Circle. School of Oriental & African Studies. 
Newsletter 9, no. 26 (1981): 51–58. 
very beginning of the Indonesian inde-
pendence, the Indonesian military had 
influenced almost all aspects of life. The 
power of the military had immensely 
been aggressive and culminated by mo-
nopolizing political power and develop-
ing the dual-function doctrine that en-
compassed ideological, political, social, 
economic, cultural, and religious fields. 
The military even got itself involved as 
interpreters of the Pancasila doctrine, 
filled executive positions at all levels of 
Indonesia's civil administration, func-
tioned as an intermediary for political 
parties and was actively involved in 
commercial projects through military 
business organizations. The implication 
is that there was a serious problem re-
garding military‟s efficiency as an effec-
tive fighting force as seen during the 
conflict of Timor Leste. 
The military views the dual function 
as a philosophy, a heart, a soul and spir-
it in carrying out duties. This doctrine 
gives an inspiration that the fields of 
defense, state security, and social and 
political development are inseparable.11 
It started in the Old Order and later in 
the New Order it was officially perpet-
uated by Suharto in 1982 through an 
enactment of regulation regarding basic 
provisions for the defense and security 
of the Republic of Indonesia.12 The 
                                                          
11  Naureen Nazar, “Involvement of Military in 
Indonesia Politics,” Asia Pasific, A Research 
Journal of Far East & South East Asia 25, no. 
June (2007): 75–89.  
12  Law Number 20 of 1982 on Principal 
Provisions for the Defense and Security of 
the Republic of Indonesia 
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regulation was more determined by po-
litical policies of military leaders who 
occupied almost all civilian‟s political 
positions in Indonesia. The existence of 
the dual function during the New Order 
period was also influenced by several 
factors: (a) A reward for being consid-
ered successful against PKI rebels; (b) a 
perception that military leaders were 
more qualified compared to civilian 
elites; (c) a commitment to maintain 
economic and development stability; (d) 
an effort to preserve power; (e) an obe-
dience to obey military leaders; and (f) 
safeguarding military‟s interests.13 
The implementation of the military‟s 
dual function was carried out massively 
during the New Order period, which 
received an open public protest in 1998. 
Socio-political development influenced 
by student movements became a loco-
motive of change for the fundamental 
order of the Indonesian people, espe-
cially the demands for reform and de-
mocratization in social, political, eco-
nomic and security fields. Student 
movements‟ success to end Suharto‟s 
rule would not have been possible 
without support from the military. The 
support was motivated by an increas-
ingly intense, changing direction of 
Seoharto's relations with Islamic 
groups; Soeharto's family and crony‟s 
businesses that were seen dominating 
compared to that of the military; mili-
tary‟s ambition for a political change in 
                                                          
13  Akhmad Junaidi, “Kegagalan TNI Dalam 
Membangun Demokrasi Di Indonesia 
Tahun 1966 - 1997” (Universitas Jember, 
2008). 
line with its interests; and an effort to 
avoid the destruction of Indonesia.14  
The culmination of this social 
movement was Soeharto's resignation 
as President of the Republic of Indone-
sia and the revocation of the dual func-
tion doctrine in the socio-political life. 
State political decisions through Article 
30 paragraphs (3) and (4) of the 1945 
Constitution15, MPR Decree No. VI / 
MPR / 200016, and Article 39 of the TNI 
Law17 give a total mandate to ban mili-
tary‟s involvement in social, political 
and economic activities. The military‟s 
focus is to concentrate on state sover-
eignty, national defense and the separa-
tion of the TNI and the Police. 
Military Reform  
The political situation after 1998/1999 
and the fundamental phase in the struc-
turing of military professionalism in the 
context of state administration is the 
constitution that governs TNI‟s authori-
ty and duties. The three dimensions of 
land, sea and air have a joint responsi-
bility to ensure the defense of the coun-
try, to protect the Indonesian people, 
and to ensure the unity and sovereignty 
of Indonesia. This context was then 
                                                          
14  Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, Tni-Polri Di Masa 
Perubahan Politik, ed. Al Araf, ke-2 
(Bandung: Magister Studi Pertahanan ITB 
dan Imparsial, 2008). 
15  The 1945 Constitution, Amendment II 
16  MPR Decree No. VI / MPR / 2000 on the 
Separation of the Indonesian National 
Army from the Indonesian National Police 
17  Law Number 34 of 2004 on the Indonesian 
National Army 
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strengthened by the separation of the 
TNI and the Police which set a demar-
cation between national defense and 
state security tasks. Likewise, the birth 
of the TNI Law18 was based on a con-
sideration to make the armed forces be-
come more professional in carrying out 
duties and submissive to state's political 
decisions. The military is prohibited 
from carrying out insubordination ac-
tions against legitimate civilian gov-
ernment orders. The implementation of 
this professional task is intended to pro-
tect values and principles of democracy 
and to uphold civil supremacy and hu-
man rights to ensure the fulfillment of 
national law, including international 
legal instruments that have been rati-
fied into domestic law. 
The next professionalism change is a 
paradigm shift. Before reformasi the mil-
itary authoritatively determined its own 
actions that influenced national policies. 
The military even exerted its influence 
on politics to determine the scale of na-
tional threats, entered foreign politics 
sphere, and took action on behalf of the 
country. For the sake of military profes-
sionalism now all military actions must 
be subject to political decisions made 
based on the mandate of power based 
on election results by president and 
House of Representatives. The military 
no longer decides unilaterally as to 
what decision is best for the nation.19  
                                                          
18  Law Number 34 of 2004 on the Indonesian 
National Army 
19  Agus Widjojo, “Reformasi TNI,” in TNI-
Polri Di Masa Perubahan, ed. Al Araf, 
Nevertheless, it has to be admitted 
that the transition to a more agile, pro-
fessional military with sophisticated 
technology requires a long adaptation. 
Adjustment to new doctrines or para-
digms, personnel‟s power revitalization, 
and organization's vision planning are 
all complex aspects. The stages of this 
reform are carried out gradually to 
bridge the interests of all elements of 
national politics. Adaptation needs for 
both civilian and military elites are in-
fluential to one another and requires a 
calculation. The supporting factor is the 
importance of building commitment 
and trust in each other. Military elites 
must be convinced that there is no de-
crease in prestige, organizational integ-
rity and the interests of national defense 
with the application of civilian control. 
Conversely, this adaptation is also re-
quired for civil elites to increase self-
confidence, a preparation for managing 
and regulating the interests of the 
state.20 
The new paradigm is a key element 
that determines the direction of military 
reform based on an analytical and pro-
spective way of thinking towards the 
future. This attitude is based on a com-
prehensive approach that plays a role in 
military‟s socio-political field, including 
(a) changing the method that is not al-
ways at the forefront of the direction of 
                                                                                      
Pertama (Bandung: ITB dan Imparsial, 
2008), pp. 22–33. 
20  Larry Diamond & Mark F. Plattner, Civil 
Military Relations and Democration, First 
(Baltimore, USA: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996). 
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the state, (b) changing the concept from 
occupying to giving influence, (c) 
changing the method of influence from 
being directly to policy makers to be 
indirect, and (d) attitude and willing-
ness to carry out political and role shar-
ing with all elements in Indonesia.21 
The next phase after the paradigm 
shift is internal reposition and reorgani-
zation according to the demands of the 
reform. Professional commitment affir-
mation of the military is needed to real-
ize a new, better Indonesia. In order to 
ensure the commitment and achieve the 
ideal goals as intended, various internal 
military reform efforts have been car-
ried out, including: (a) revocation of the 
concept and implementation of the dual 
function; (b) restructuring territorial 
command; (c) reform of military justice 
system; (d) prohibition of doing busi-
ness; and (e) military professionalism in 
national defense.22 
Technical implementation in mili-
tary reform of the TNI is carried out 
through twenty-four agendas aimed at 
making the military more professional, 
namely:23  
 
 
 
                                                          
21  Amarulla Octavian, Militer Dan Globalisasi, 
ed. Deniek G Sukarya, Kedua (Jakarta: PT 
Sukarya & Sukarya Pandetama, 2012). 
22  Al Araf, “Dinamika Peran TNI,” Diskusi 
Publik Quo Vadis Reformasi Militer 
(Jakarta, 2019)   . 
23  “Sejarah TNI”, accesed on october 18th, 
2019, https://tni.mil.id/pages-10-sejarah-
tni.html 
Table 1: Agenda for Military Reform 
in Indonesia 
No Reform Agenda 
1 
To arrange and determine the 
direction and new paradigm of 
the 21st century military. 
2 
To develop a roadmap for the role 
of the military as a preventive and 
anticipatory measure to face fu-
ture challenges which is a new 
paradigm actualization of the 21st 
century military. 
3 
To Separate functions, institutions 
(organizations) and authority of 
the Police from the Armed Forces 
of the Republic of Indonesia 
(ABRI) since the ruling dated 
April 1, 1999 which was an initial 
transformation step towards mili-
tary professionalism. 
4 
To remove military‟s involvement 
or the dual function through an 
early retirement or a switch of 
civil service status through Decree 
Number 03 / II / 1999. 
5 
Measures to abolish the Social and 
Political Council at the national 
and regional levels as part of the 
abolishment of military‟s in-
volvement. 
6 
To gradually revitalize members 
of the TNI / Polri faction in the 
DPR RI and DPRD I and II and 
the elimination of the faction in 
the context of eliminating socio-
political functions. 
7 
Prohibition from engaging in all 
forms of practical politics. 
8 
Impartiality with all Indonesia‟s 
political parties and terminating 
organizational relation with Gol-
kar. 
9 Affirming a consistent attitude 
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and neutrality in all elections, 
including regional elections. 
10 
Restructuring military relations 
with the TNI‟s Greater Family 
11 
Renewal and revision of military 
doctrines in accordance with the 
mandate of reformasi and TNI‟s 
role in the 21st Century. 
12 
Revitalization of roles and tasks of 
Social Political Staff to be Social 
Communication Staff. 
13 
Conducting structural changes to 
Head of Social and Political Staff 
(Kassospol) to be Chief of Territori-
al Staff (Kaster). 
14 
Abolition of units related to socio-
political matters, especially from 
the central level, kodam, korem and 
kodim. 
15 
Dissolution of organizations such 
as staff of security and public or-
der, Employee Development 
Agency and ABRI's Employee 
Staff. 
16 
Establishing accountability for 
foundations or business entities 
owned by the military. 
17 Dissolution of the organization 
concerning the placement of Dep-
uty TNI Commander. 
18 
Elimination of National Stability 
Strengthening Assistance (Ba-
korstanas) at central and regional 
levels. 
19 
Affirmation of early retirement 
commitment for military person-
nel running for regional election 
since screening time or candidate 
registration. 
20 
Abolition of the Alert Command 
Center. 
21 
In education field the military 
revokes social and political con-
tents from the curriculum. 
22 
Liquidity towards the TNI Terri-
torial Chief of Staff organization. 
23 
Elimination of Social Communica-
tion Staff based on the TNI Com-
mander‟s SKEP No.21 / VI / 2005. 
24 
Imposing the doctrine of Tri 
Dharma Eka Karma (Tridek) to 
replace Catur Dharma Eka Karma 
(Cadek). The policy is mandated 
by the TNI Commander Decree 
No. Kep / 2 / I / 2007, dated Jan-
uary 12, 2007. 
Source: Processed from TNI History 
Although various agendas have 
been carried out, contemporary condi-
tions indicate that internal military re-
form has not yet been complete, espe-
cially as to the role of the military be-
yond national defense. In social and 
economic aspects, the MoUs between 
the military and other agencies become 
a new model of military‟s involvement 
in various domains. In fact, the House 
of Representatives Commission I rec-
orded 30 MoUs initiated by military 
elites without political decisions of the 
state with House of Representatives‟ 
approval as the authority holder of 
siyāsah sharʻiyyah. Some MoUs were 
deemed out of context by the public, 
including the ones regulating rice pro-
duction and the establishment of an In-
tegrated Rice Farmers Service Center 
(SP3T) to support government policies 
related to food self-sufficiency.24 
                                                          
24  Kristian Edrianto “Pimpinan Komisi I Kritik 
TNI soal Pembuatan MoU dan Program 
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Another urgent problem is military‟s 
transformation from exerting influence 
at national executive level to regional. 
Marcus Mietzner in his „Business as 
Usual? The Indonesian Armed Forces 
and Local Politics in the Post-Suharto 
Era‟ describes the phenomenon of pow-
er consolidation and migration of the 
military to influence regional autonomy 
policies.25 The implication is that mili-
tary elites influence and participate in 
determining local elections, although 
support for candidates is given secre-
tively, limited and in a sporadic man-
ner. One of the paradoxes of military 
reform efforts after Soeharto era and 
external institutions‟ insistence regard-
ing good governance such as from the 
World Bank and the International Mon-
etary Fund is that military‟s power has 
shifted and rooted in local commanders. 
The patronage network consolidation 
and rent-seeking practice are localized 
when problematic accountability be-
comes more decentralized.26 
This practice of influence is previ-
ously conducted behind a closed door, 
                                                                                      
Cetak Sawah”, accessed on October 18th,  
2019, 
https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2017/
11/23/22391541/pimpinan-komisi-i-kritik-
tni-soal-pembuatan-mou-dan-program-
cetak-sawah 
25  Evan A Laksamana, “Dari Reformasi Militer 
Menuju Transformasi Pertahanan: 
Tantangan Dan Prospek Ke Depan,” Jurnal 
Indonesian Review 1, no. Agustus (2010): 2–
14. 
26  Mark Beeson, “Civil-Military Relations in 
Indonesia and the Philippines: Will the Thai 
Coup Prove Contagious?,” Armed Forces and 
Society 34, no. 3 (2008): 474–490. 
yet the first phase of the 2015 simulta-
neous local elections becomes a turning 
point. During that period the military 
reappeared in social and political life. 
The General Election Commission 
(KPU) recorded 16 candidates from the 
TNI and the Police. The peak is the 2018 
simultaneous elections, which was re-
ferred to as war of generals. Six generals 
(active and retired) were fighting to be-
come governors and vice governors, 
they were Lieutenant General Edy 
Rahmayadi, Major General Sudrajat, 
Major General TB Hasanudin, Inspector 
General of Police Anton Charliyan, In-
spector General of Police Murad Ismail, 
and Inspector General of Police Sa-
farudin. There were 8 active military 
and police officers fighting for regent / 
mayor positions and 4 nominating 
themselves for vice regents / mayors.27 
Based on these empirical facts, it is 
worth-noting that military reform is a 
long-term process that does not have a 
definite end point. This process will 
keep developing along with Indonesia's 
political and social evolution that con-
tinues from autocracy to democracy, 
which is in line with national objectives. 
The process of acculturation and mod-
ernization as well as the socialization of 
reformist defense structures are a long 
process whose outcome is seen after 25 
                                                          
27  Reja Hidayat, “Perang Perwira TNI dan 
Polri dalam Pilkada 2018”, accessed on 
October 27th,  2019, 
https://google.com/amp/s/amp.tirto.id/p
erang-perwira-tni-dan-polri-dalam-pilkada-
2018-cC1M  
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years.28 John Bradfod reminded the im-
portance of political and institutional 
structure of society to balance military 
evolution.29 Military intervention on ci-
vilian‟s political life in the long run will 
damage its professionalism. To antici-
pate this, the establishment of a good 
political structure and the consolidation 
of civil society groups to supervise the 
military in a constructive manner be-
come indispensable. 
Military Operations Other Than 
War 
Military Operations Other than War, 
hereinafter referred to as the MOOTW, 
is a series of Indonesian military author-
ities regulated in Article 7 letter b of the 
TNI Law.30 The MOOTW is a supple-
mentary to the main function of the mil-
itary, which is to conduct war in the 
framework of upholding country's sov-
ereignty, maintain territorial integrity, 
and protect Indonesia from threats and 
instabilities. 
The implementation of the MOOTW 
often clashes with law enforcement offi-
cials, government agencies and other 
civil elements. In the TNI Law there are 
                                                          
28 John B Haseman, “Indonesian Military 
Reform: More Than a Human Rights Issue,” 
Journal Southeast Asian Affairs, vol. 2006 
(Maryland, USA, 2006). 
29  Bratdford, “The Indonesian Military as A 
Professional Organization : Criteria and 
Ramifications for Reform.” Vol. 73. RSIS 
Working Paper. Singapore: Nanyang 
Technological University, 2005 
30  Law Number 34 of 2004 on the Indonesian 
National Army. 
no clear provisions that define the 
MOOTW and there is only a stipulation 
of fields (list of provisions). In general, 
fields in which the military can get in-
volved are activities related to: (a) con-
fronting armed movements; (b) over-
coming armed rebellions; (c) dealing 
with terrorism; (d) border surveillance; 
(e) securing national objects / assets; (f) 
carrying out world peace on the basis of 
free and active politics; (g) securing 
President and Vice President, including 
their families; (h) fostering universal 
defense system; (i) assisting Regional 
Leaders in their duties; (j) giving assis-
tance to the National Police within the 
framework of security and public order; 
(k) giving assistance to safeguard state 
guests at the level of state leader and 
representatives of foreign governments; 
(l) natural disaster relief, humanitarian 
assistance, refugee management; (m) 
searching and rescuing victims of acci-
dents; (n) giving assistance to safeguard 
flights and shipping from piracy and 
smuggling. 
Regulating the MOOTW is not an 
easy thing to do, including for a devel-
oped country like the United States af-
ter the end of World War II. James R. 
Ayers in „Military Operations Other 
Than War in the New World Order: An 
Analysis of Joint Doctrine for The Com-
ing Era‟31 reveals the difficulty of de-
termining a precise and comprehensive 
definition of the MOOTW. The 
MOOTW approach is simply based on 
                                                          
31  Diandra Megaputri Mengko, “Problematika 
Tugas Perbantuan TNI,” Jurnal Keamanan 
Nasional 1, no. 2 (2015): 175–196. 
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the purpose of preventive operations 
which is to maintain peace and prevent 
war. In practice, there are variations re-
garding the MOOTW‟s scope and regu-
lations that are influenced by internal 
circumstances of a country, factors of 
political system, historical aspects, and 
threats faced by a country. USA‟s Navy 
and Army departments in Joint Pub 3-
07: Joint Doctrine for Military Opera-
tions Other Than War provides 
roadmaps and guidelines on the 
MOOTW for the military. The MOOTW 
is positioned as a combination of mili-
tary‟s power instruments that are dif-
ferent from war operations. All actions 
taken are carried out within the frame-
work of promoting peace aimed at pro-
tecting national interests. For this rea-
son, professional military personnel are 
required, a force that understands polit-
ical objectives of their country and po-
tential impacts of the actions.32 
However difficult it is to define and 
regulate the MOOTW, the Indonesian 
military needs it as a legal basis and tac-
tical needs. For elites and civilians the 
MOOTW serves as part of control over 
military's roles in various spheres. This 
need has actually become a focus of 
DPR‟s Commission I since 2007.33 
Therefore, it is important that we urge 
the government and DPR which, in the 
                                                          
32  U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for 
Military Operations Other Than War, Pertama 
(Washington DC: Department of The Army 
and Department of The Navy US, 1995). 
33  Theo L Sambuaga, “TNI-Polri Di Masa 
Perubahan Politik,” in TNI-Polri Di Masa 
Perubahan, ed. Al Araf, Petama (Jakarta: ITB 
dan Imparsial, 2007), pp. v–x. 
conception of siyāsah sharʻiyyah, func-
tion as leaders (rulers) to determine 
laws or policies that are in line with the 
needs of the people based on situations 
and conditions of the country as well as 
its people to begin an initiation of regu-
lation formation that regulates military 
assistance tasks. The urgency is based 
on: (a) a clear and detailed legal founda-
tion that regulates assistance tasks 
adopted and agreed upon by all ele-
ments in Indonesia; (b) a comprehen-
sive roadmap to regulate and determine 
limitations to control military initiatives 
that affect social and political life or oc-
cupy strategic positions beyond the 
main tasks of national defense; (c) an 
effective means to review all military‟s 
programs and policies, especially vari-
ous collaborations (MoUs) with institu-
tions / agencies, and state-owned en-
terprises that are not related to the main 
tasks and scope of the MOOTW; (d) a 
means to elaborate, mitigate and resolve 
chronic problems in the military with 
regard to the positional needs of its of-
ficers34; and (e) to regulate legal rela-
tions for the military when occupying 
civilian positions and / or performing 
assistance tasks, including criminal lia-
bility. 
Civil-Military Relations in Siyāsah 
Sharʻiyah Perspective 
Civil-military relations in Indonesia 
since the beginning of independence 
                                                          
34  Agus Widjojo, “Diskusi Terfokus: Quo 
Vadis Militer Dalam Urusan Sipil”, Komnas 
HAM RI, March 1th, 2019. 
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until now have continued to revolution-
ize. The dynamics of the independence 
had created an intense pattern of civil-
military relations that was strengthened 
in the New Order. Suharto‟s focus was 
not only on civil and politics, but also 
almost on all fields, including economy, 
society, and culture. Through the dual-
function doctrine, the military exercised 
control over civilian life, regulated and 
influenced the direction of the nation 
which lasted until Suharto's fall from 
power. Referring to Clark Benner Lom-
bardi's view of siyāsah sharʻiyyah whose 
concept gives authority to the govern-
ment (legislative and executive) to regu-
late government affairs and make laws 
and regulations, yet in practice they 
were all under the shadow of the mili-
tary. It was the 1998 demonstration 
leading to Soeharto's withdrawal be-
came the momentum to bring about re-
form to the constitution, erasing the du-
al-function concept and efforts to return 
the military to their barracks, and made 
the civilian government as a power 
holder in government affairs of Indone-
sia. 
Nevertheless, to establish ideal civil-
military relations is not easy, especially 
for a new democratic state. Civil-
military relations depend on actions of 
elected civilian leaders. The factor of 
being capable to improve people's wel-
fare, economic level, law, and of course 
maintaining public order will be keys to 
constructing civil supremacy. Failing to 
manifest control, potential and internal 
needs of the state by civil elites will al-
low them to use the military in every 
issue. The implication is detrimental if 
military‟s involvement is aimed at ful-
filling political ambitions.35 
Indonesia, although not a religion-
based country, is in line with principles 
of an Islamic state that governs the 
structural relations model of leaders 
(government), society (ummah) and law 
(sharia) in which there is a legal concept 
of siyāsah sharʻiyyah, that is giving au-
thority to leaders (government) to de-
termine and enforce laws. Since reforma-
si it has clearly chosen the concept of 
civil-military relations. The government 
serves as a power controller while the 
military acts as an instruction executor, 
and the delivery of influence (inputs) to 
the leader is conducted indirectly. 
The selection of this siyāsah 
sharʻiyyah civil-military relations model 
is in line with Samuel P Huntington's 
concept and theory regarding objective 
civilian control.36 Civil-military rela-
tions in „objective civilian control‟ con-
cept put military power under civilian 
control so that government and state 
systems are fully determined by civil-
ians. The military is required to be pro-
fessional to focus on its duties and re-
sponsibilities as a national defense body 
without interfering in the dynamics of 
national and international political. This 
model places the military in a subordi-
                                                          
35  Larry Diamond & Mark F. Plattner, Civil 
Military Relations and Democration, First 
(Baltimore, USA: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996). 
36  Samuel P. Huntington, “Civilian Control 
and The Constitution,” American Political 
Science Review 50, no. 03 (2011): 676–699. 
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nation position to civilian authority, 
gives room for military autonomy and 
minimizes military‟s intervention in 
politics.37 In addition, it is also in line 
with Peter D Feaver‟s agency theory38, 
which emphasizes three key elements of 
civil-military relations in both non-
intrusive and intrusive conditions, 
namely: (a) that there is a competitive 
difference between civilians and mili-
tary roles; (b) that the key to civilian 
control is professionalism, and (c) that 
the key to professionalism is military 
autonomy. 
Some indicators demonstrate that 
objective civilian control and agency 
theory has been carried out and seen in 
several aspects in Indonesia: first, inter-
nal military reforms that conceptually 
abolish the dual-function doctrine and 
strive towards professional military fo-
cusing on national defense tasks; se-
cond, the military is subject to civil su-
premacy. The implications of the dual 
function abolishment are that the mili-
tary returns to its main tasks and avoids 
to exert its influence on civilian‟s politi-
cal life. The military acts to carry out 
official duties of the highest authority, 
which is the President as head of gov-
ernment, head of state, as well as war 
commander; third, in the administrative 
                                                          
37  Samuel P Huntington, “Civil Military 
Relation Reform,” in Civil Military Relation 
and Democracy, First (Baltimore, USA, 1996), 
pp. 3–16. 
38  Peter D. Feaver, “Crisis as Shirking: An 
Agency Theory Explanation of the Souring 
of American Civil-Military Relations,” 
Armed Forces and Society Journal 24, no. 3 
(1998): 407–434. 
and budgetary aspects, the military is 
under the ministry of defense control. 
As a consequence, all planning, imple-
menting and evaluating process of the 
military is carried out by Minister of 
Defense.  
Autonomy given to the military 
through a commander is in the frame-
work of improving capability, tactical 
and war strategy. Government‟s success 
to regulate civil-military relations is in-
separable from various internal and ex-
ternal factors. The internal factors are 
based on civilian and military elites‟ 
awareness of situations and conditions 
faced by Indonesia in economic, social, 
and political fields that can lead to na-
tional divisions. Meanwhile, the exter-
nal factors are a shift of paradigm for 
military elites who receive education 
and training from developed countries 
regarding military professionalism and 
civilian control over the military.39 
Thus, after two decades of reformasi 
the objective civilian control model and 
agency theory have been selected by 
Indonesian leaders as a relation pattern 
to regulate civil-military law relations 
and the military's structural position in 
the state. The model is used as a desired 
policy to regulate the state (siyāsah 
sharʻiyyah) with an aim of upholding the 
principle of al-ʻadālah wa murāʼat al-
maṣāliḥ al-jāmiʻ al-nās which is oriented 
towards justice and the interests of civil 
society. Even so, it seems that the re-
                                                          
39  Samuel P Huntington, “Civil Military 
Relation Reform,” in Civil Military Relation 
and Democracy, First (Baltimore, USA, 1996), 
pp. 3–16. 
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structuring efforts have not yet been 
comprehensive as seen in the ups and 
downs or lack of a standard format of 
civil-military relations after reformasi. 
Under the BJ Habibie administra-
tion, the model of civil-military rela-
tions was turbulence that the relations 
built were still sporadic and very de-
pendent on military elites in carrying 
out reforms. The Abdurrahman Wa-
hid‟s model was a pattern of conflict 
and confrontation. This condition is 
mainly related to issues of conflicts in 
Aceh and Papua and changes in tradi-
tion of military commanders with a ro-
tation pattern, bringing dynamics with-
in the military aimed at reducing the 
dominance of one unit. Negotiation pat-
tern was Megawati‟s government‟s 
preferable choice. This model was car-
ried out by not interfering in the inter-
nal role of the military and tended to be 
defensive against civil society‟s insist-
ence on military reform acceleration, 
including a state of emergency declara-
tion in Aceh so that the military would 
then be asymmetrical in dealing with 
human rights.40 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono‟s ad-
ministration (SBY) used a compromise 
model.41 The model is in line with SBY‟s 
                                                          
40  Muhamad Haripin, “Relasi Sipil-Militer 
Dan Ancaman Di Indonesia Pasca Orde 
Baru,” in Menimbang Demokrasi Dua Dekade 
Reformasi, ed. Syamsudin Haris, Pertama Ju 
(Jakarta: Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia, 
2019), p. 556. 
41  Syamsudin Haris, "Diskusi Terfokus: Quo 
Vadis Militer Dalam Urusan Sipil”, Komnas 
HAM RI, March 1th, 2019 
accommodating leadership style em-
bracing all civilian and military elites, 
trying to avoid conflicts, and starting to 
encourage an active role of the military 
in the international world through 
peacekeeping forces. Such a model is 
most evident in the return of military‟s 
role to civilian realm through MoUs 
with civilian institutions or BUMN. One 
aspect that is still problematic for the 
military is perception of internal 
threats, an insecure perspective towards 
the rise of leftist or the PKI. 
Likewise, civil-military relations in 
the Joko Widodo‟s administration use a 
compromise model. The military and 
former military elites are still given sig-
nificant roles in the government, includ-
ing occupying ministerial positions.42 
Military‟s involvement in various 
grounds through MoUs is also not 
evaluated or eliminated. The issue to 
resolve gross human rights violations 
that allegedly involves military elites is 
stagnant despite it being Jokowi‟s nawa 
cita promise and program. The Rela-
tionship with victims of the 1965 inci-
dent, including reconciliation process 
with a demand for an apology has also 
failed. The role of the military is in-
creasingly visible in the counter-
terrorism program that the military is 
given a role through the revision of the 
                                                          
42  Devira Prastiwi, ”Deretan Jenderal TNI dan 
Polri Ini Dipilih Jadi Menteri Jokowi”, 
accessed on August 11th, 2019, 
https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/40
93316/deretan-jenderal-tni-dan-polri-ini-
dipilih-jadi-menteri-jokowi 
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anti-terror laws.43 The birth of special 
regulations from the government, in-
cluding Presidential Regulation No. 37 
of 2019, apart from its substance that 
aims to regulate and expand new posi-
tions of the military, shows govern-
ment's dominance in making decisions 
that do not involve civilian parliamen-
tary authorities because it is not an op-
tion to make law assistance as an im-
plementation of the MOOTW arrange-
ments. 
Based on the description delivered 
and related to the two decades of refor-
masi with the government periodization 
of siyāsah sharʻiyyah from BJ Habibie, 
Abdurahman Wahid, Megawati, Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono and Joko Wido-
do, which is marked by the regulation 
of civil-military relations, there seems to 
be no right model and still requires se-
rious improvement. Formally, a civilian 
government is positioned in a format of 
power controller, but if we look at the 
dynamics of the civil-military relations 
model that have occurred from turbu-
lence, confrontation, negotiation and 
compromise, the relations have been 
greatly influenced by the politics of a 
ruling president and politicians‟ seri-
ousness in the parliament. Civil groups, 
academics and various social organiza-
tions have thus far sidelined and need 
to consolidate themselves to oversee 
reformasi’s big agenda, namely civil su-
                                                          
43  Law Number 5 of 2018 on the Amendment 
of Law Number 15 of 2003 on the 
Stipulation of Government Regulations in 
Lieu of Law Number 1 of 2002 on the 
Eradication of Terrorism Crimes Into Law. 
premacy, democratization and human 
rights enforcement for a purpose of the 
Ummah and upholding justice (al-ʻadālah 
wa murāʼat al- maṣāliḥ al-jāmiʻi al-nās). 
Conclusion 
From the discussion above it can be 
concluded that: (a) Indonesian leaders 
since the independence phase until the 
New Order have determined the ar-
rangements of (siyāsah sharʻiyyah) relat-
ed to civil-military relations by assign-
ing the military as a dominant actor in 
socio-political life through the dual-
function doctrine. Since the 1998 refor-
masi, civilian leaders have undertaken 
constitutional reforms and enacted laws 
to place the military under civilian con-
trol through encouragement of internal 
military reforms to get the military fo-
cused on national defense. Despite so, 
the military has now evolved in civil-
ian‟s political life taking part in regional 
elections and bilateral approaches with 
ministries / institutions through coop-
eration (MoUs); (b) there has not been 
political will from Indonesian leaders to 
enact laws as an implementation of the 
concept of siyāsah sharʻiyyah, especially 
laws that regulate military assistance 
for operations other than war to avoid 
potential clashes with other institutions 
/ agencies, regulates scope, boundaries, 
implementation, and accountability 
mechanisms of the military in roles out-
side of its main task as a national de-
fense force. (c) Indonesian leaders in the 
post-reformasi era have established ob-
jective civilian control as a model of civ-
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il-military relations as the implementa-
tion of siyāsah sharʻiyyah for the purpose 
of justice and public interest. In prac-
tice, the placement of the military in ci-
vilian subordination is varied and pat-
ronized. It is indicated in changes of 
models; turbulence, confrontation, ne-
gotiation and compromise. Military 
elites (including those who are no long-
er active) remain to be accommodated 
in civilian government structure, while 
demands for reforms regarding the res-
olution of gross human rights violations 
have merely become „lip-service‟ politi-
cal programs in every five-year political 
contestation. 
Based on this conclusion, several al-
ternative actions are encouraged: (a) en-
couraging civilian elites to consistently 
comply with the constitution and its de-
rivative regulations that place the mili-
tary as a professional army whose task 
is to ensure national defense and state 
sovereignty, by avoiding efforts to drag 
the military to re-engage in socio-
political affairs; (b) enacting a military 
assistance law as a vehicle for adopting 
military roles outside military opera-
tions other than war. The enactment of 
this law is a civil agreement for legiti-
macy and legal basis to put restrictions 
on military‟s roles beyond its main 
tasks and functions; (c) ensuring civilian 
control over the military which is 
strengthened by all civilian elements; 
the government, parliament and the 
public. The strengthening is carried out 
at the level of regulation, infrastructure 
and political policies, while at the same 
time maintaining military professional-
ism through autonomy in tactical, tech-
nical and combat strategy management.  
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